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Abstract
This paper addresses the issues involved in software agents
making trade-offs during automated negotiations in which
they have information uncertainty and resource limitations.
In particular, the importance of being able to make trade-
offs in real-world applications is highlighted and a novel
algorithm for performing trade-offs for multi-dimensional
goods is developed. The algorithm uses the notion of fuzzy
similarity in order to ﬁndnegotiationsolutionsthat are ben-
eﬁcial to both parties. Empirical results indicate the bene-
ﬁts and effectiveness of the trade-offalgorithm in a range of
negotiation situations.
1. Introduction
Negotiation is a key form of interaction in multi-agent
systems. It is important precisely because the agents are au-
tonomous; that is, they decide for themselves what actions
they should perform, at what time, and under what terms
and conditions. Since such agents have no direct control
over one another, they must negotiate in order to manage
their interdependencies. Thus, we view negotiation as a
process by which a joint decision is made by two or more
parties. The parties ﬁrst verbalise contradictory demands
and then move towards agreements [9].
Automated negotiation exists in many shapes and forms:
ranging from simple auctions in which agents merely have
to bid truthfully [17], to complex strategic models in which
agents argue for positions and aim to persuade their oppo-
nents of the value of a particular course of action [8]. In
this work, however, we are interested in a particular class
of negotiation: service-oriented negotiation [14]. In such
negotiations, a producer and a consumer have to come to
a mutually acceptable agreement over the terms and condi-
tions under which the producer will execute some problem
￿On leave at IIIA-CSIC.
solving activity for the consumer. Speciﬁc issues that need
to be agreed include the price of the service, the time at
which it is required, the quality of the delivered service and
the penalty to be paid for reneging upon the agreement.
In previous work [4], we investigated the design of
reasoning mechanisms that enable agents to act competi-
tively (obtain deals that are good for themselves) in service-
oriented negotiationsin which they have limited knowledge
and computational resources. However, based on our expe-
riences in the domains of business process management [6]
and telecommunications network management [3], we ﬁnd
that in some cases there is also a need for agents to act in a
more socially responsiblemanner. Thus, some of the agents
in the business process management application are part of
the same overarching organisation and some of the agents
in the telecommunications application are from the same
network operator. In such cases, the agents are concerned
bothwith the outcomeof the negotiationforthemselves and
for their negotiation opponent. In short, they care about eq-
uity andsocial welfare [2], as well as their individualutility.
This requirementleads us to considerdesigningmodels that
can uncoverwin-win negotiationsolutions [10], again in the
presence of limited knowledge and computational bound-
edness. Win-win negotiation refers to bargaining situations
where both parties search for solutions that “squeeze out”
more gains (either mutually or individually) than the cur-
rently agreed deal.
The particular mechanism for win-win negotiation that
we explore here is that of agents making trade-offs. Intu-
itively, a trade-off is where one party lowers its scores on
some negotiation issues and simultaneously demands more
on others. Thus, an agent may accept a service of lower
quality if it is cheaper or a shorter deadline if it receives
a higher price. Such movements are intended to generate
an offer that, although of the same value to the proposer,
may beneﬁt the negotiation opponent and hence increase
the overall joint gains [10] between the two agents.
The contribution of this work is twofold. Firstly, extant
workonautomatednegotiationhas largelyignoredthe issueof making trade-offs. Even when it has been dealt with, the
advocated approach is based on assumptions that are un-
realistic for real-world settings (section 4). Secondly, we
present a novel algorithm for making trade-offs,in the pres-
ence of information uncertainty and resource boundedness,
formulti-dimensionalgoodsbased uponthe notionof fuzzy
similarity [18]. Moreover, this algorithm is analysed theo-
retically (to determine its complexity) and evaluated empir-
ically (to ascertain its operational performance).
The remainder of the paper is structured in the follow-
ing manner. Section 2 presents our algorithm for mak-
ingtrade-offsinservice-orientednegotiations(includingthe
complexity analysis). Section 3 provides an empirical eval-
uation of our trade-off mechanism. Section 4 compares our
approach to previous work on automated negotiation and
section 5 outlines our conclusions and future work.
2. Making Trade-Offs
In our previous mechanism [4], agents proposed a se-
ries of contracts that had diminishing value to themselves
(here we term such mechanisms responsive). However, in
choosing to make a trade-off negotiation action, an agent is
seeking to ﬁnd a contract that has the same value to itself as
its previous proposal, but which is more acceptable to (has
highervaluefor)its negotiationopponent. Whendoingthis,
the agent would like to know its opponent’s utility function
in order to ﬁnd the counter proposal that maximises the op-
ponent’s return. However, in our scenarios, this function is
privateand so a similarity functionis used as an approxima-
tion.
 
 
 
 
B
a
s
i
c
s
o
f
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
O
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
N
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
This sub-section outlines the basics of our service-
oriented model (refer to [4] for more details). Let
i
(
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g) be the issues under negotiation (eg price, de-
livery time, quality of service and penalty). Further, let
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  be a value for issue
j that is accept-
able to agent
i. We limit ourselves to considering issues
for which negotiation amounts to determining a value be-
tween an agent’s deﬁned delimited range. Each agent has
a scoring function
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  that gives
the score agent
i assigns to a value of issue
j in the range
of its acceptable values. For convenience, scores are kept
in the interval
 
 
 
 
 . The relative importance that an agent
assigns to each issue under negotiation is modelled as a
weight,
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j, that gives the importance of issue
j for agent
i. We assume the weights of both agents are normalized,
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For analytical purposes we restrict ourselves to an addi-
tive and monotonically increasing or decreasing value scor-
ing system.
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An agent will decide to make a trade-off action when
it does not wish to decrease its aspirational level (denoted
 ) for a given service-oriented negotiation. Thus, the agent
ﬁrst needs to generate some/all of the potential contracts
for which it receives the score of
 . Technically, it needs
to generate contracts that lie on the iso-value (or indiffer-
ence) curve for
  [10]. As all these potential contracts have
the same value for the agent, it is indifferent amongst them.
Giventhis fact, the aim ofthe trade-offmechanismis to ﬁnd
the contract on the iso-curve that is most preferable to the
negotiation opponent (since this maximises the joint gain).
More formally, an iso-curve is deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 1 Givenanaspirationalscoringvalue
 , theiso-
curve set at level
  for agent
a is deﬁned as:
i
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From this set, the agent needs to select the contract that
maximises the joint gain. However, since an agent does not
know its opponent’s utility function some form of approxi-
mation is needed. The heuristic we employ is to select the
contract that is most “similar” to the opponent’s last pro-
posal (since this may be more acceptable to the opponent).
To compute similarity we use the concept of fuzzy similar-
ity [18]. Asuming we have a formula like “if
p then
q”,
fuzzy similarity is an approximation heuristic that supports
reasoning of the kind “if aproximately
p then aproximately
q”. This technique was chosen because it allows an agent
to approximately model the closeness of two contracts in
decision making.
A trade-off can now be deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 2 Given an offer,
x, from agent
a to
b, and a
subsequent counter offer,
y, from agent
b to
a, with
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 , a trade-off for agent
a with respect to
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as:
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where the similarity,
S
i
m, between two contracts is deﬁned
as a weighted combination of the similarity of the issues:
Deﬁnition 3 The similarity between two contracts
x and
y
over the set of issues
J is deﬁned as:
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 and
S
i
m
j being the similarity function
for issue
j. These weights represent the level of importance
the agent believes its opponent places on the various issues.
For example when reasoning about what deal to offer, an
oil company negotiator, when interacting with an ecologist,
may safely assume that the pollution risks are given greater
weight by the ecologist than the oil production costs.
Followingthe resultsfrom[16], a similarityfunctionthat
satisﬁes the axioms of reﬂexivity, symmetry, and t-norm
transitivity can always be deﬁned as a conjunction (mod-
elled, for instance, as the minimum) of appropriate fuzzy
equivalence relations induced by a set of criteria functions
h
i. A criteria function is a function that maps values from
a given domain into
 
 
 
 
 . Correspondingly, the similarity
between two values for issue
j,
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j
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 ,i sd e ﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 4 Given a domain of values
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between two values
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where
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  and
  is an equivalence operator. In
our case, the criteria functions are given in section 3.1 and
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j is used as the equivalence operator
(since this is a straightforward measure of the absolute Eu-
clidean distance between two points). The conjunction can
be any t-norm function.
To illustrate the modelling of similarity in a given do-
main, consider the example of colours.
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g.I n o r -
der to model how similar two given colours are, we can
considerdifferentperceptivecriteria. Forinstance, there are
‘warm’ colours and ‘cold’ colours. With respect to this cri-
terion, yellow and orange are more similar that yellow and
violet. We could also consider the criterion of visibility (as
wellas manyothers). Greenis the colourwiththeworst vis-
ibility and yellow and cyan are those with the best. We can
use these two criteria to model our example as (we present
functions extensively as sets of pairs (input, output)):
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where
h
t and
h
v are, respectively, the comparisonfunctions
correspondingto temperature(warm is 1, cold is 0) and vis-
ibility (maximum is 1, minimum 0).
With these functions, and using
m
i
n as conjunction, we
can obtain by simple arithmetic that:
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The trade-off algorithm performs an iterated hill-
climbing search in a landscape of possible contracts. The
search proceeds by successively generating contracts that
lie closer to the iso-curve (representing the agent’s aspira-
tion level), followed by the selection of the contract that
maximises the similarity to the opponent’s last offering.
The algorithm terminates when the last selected contract
lies on the iso-curve.
The algorithm starts at
y, the oponent’s last offer, and
movestowards the iso-curveassociated with the agent’s last
offer,
x,i n
S steps. Each step starts by randomlygenerating
N new contracts that have a utility
E greater than the con-
tract selected in the last step
y
j (or
y
￿
 
y if it is the ﬁrst
step).
N is referred to as the number of children. Each new
contract
y
j
￿
￿ so generated satisﬁes
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E.
From the generated children contracts, the one that max-
imises the similarity with respect to the oponent’s contract
y is selected.
E is computed as the overall difference be-
tween the value of
x and
y divided by the number of steps.
That is,
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S . Below we present the algorithm
responsible for generating a new random contract. This al-
gorithm will thus be invoked
N times at each step in order
to compute the best trade-off contract (giving
S
N calls in
total). The algorithm generates children by spliting the gain
in utility,
E, randomly among the set of issues under nego-
tiation.
inputs:
y
j
￿ /* last step best contract.
y
￿
￿
y */
E; /* step utility increase */
v
￿
￿; /* value scoring function */
output:
y
j
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￿; /* child of
y
j */
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In more detail: (1) maximum utility gain per issue, (2)
total maximum utility gain, (3) setting of the average num-berofiterations,(4)initializationofstepsandofgainedutil-
ity, (5)generationof a randomvaluefor utility gainforeach
issue, (6) update the utility gained in iteration
k, (7) ﬁx the
utility potential gain for next iteration, (8) normalization,
and (9) compute the value for each issue in the new con-
tract.
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When analysingthe complexityof ouralgorithm the ﬁrst
thing to note is that it includes a call to a random number
generator inside the main loop (step 5). This has a direct
impact on the number of iterations, and hence on the time
the algorithm will take. Assuming the random number gen-
erator is probabilistic in nature, we cannot make a ‘big-O’
analysis of the complexity[1]. However, what we can com-
pute is an “average case” assuming that the random genera-
tor is perfect.
Let
n be the number of negotiation issues. Steps 1, 5, 6,
7, 8, and 9 all need a time which is
O
 
n
  (
 
 
i
 
n). The
time used by the algorithm will be proportional then to the
number of iterations,
k, of the while loop, multiplied by the
cost of each iteration (which, as said, is
O
 
n
 ). That is, it
will be proportional to
k
n. Let us derive how large
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be. The while loop will terminate when
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E. We know that before entering the loop for the
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the weighted addition of the portions
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i generated by each
iteration. On average, and assuming perfect random num-
ber generation, at every iteration we will increment
E
n by
half of each issue’s maximum potential utility gain given
to the random generator, that is,
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3. Experimental Analysis
Having developed and analysed our trade-off algorithm,
the next step is to evaluate its operational performance. To
this end, we wish to obtain two types of empirical infor-
mation. One set of experiments seek to investigate the pa-
rameters of the trade-offalgorithm in generationof a single
offer, while the other set seeks to investigate the process
of negotiation when agents use trade-off and/or responsive
mechanisms. The former, referred to as single-offer experi-
ments, aim to evaluate the kernel of the trade-off algorithm.
Thelatter, referedtoasmetastrategyexperiments,dealwith
the dynamics of the algorithm when interacting with other
mechanisms.
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Both types of experiments involve an offer/offers from
onenegotiator,a
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r, to another,the
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t. Further-
more, both experiments involve negotiation over four quan-
titative issues
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 . The reser-
vation values of each issue for both agents are consid-
ered to be the same. The importance weight vectors of
the agents (section 2.1) are ﬁxed throughout the negotia-
tion:
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 1. The value function
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i used by agent
a for issue
i is a linear scoring function of the following
type:
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g and
d
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i
n
g refer to the direction
of change in score as the value of that issue increases. For
example, increasing the
p
r
i
c
e of the service decreases the
score for a client, but increases it for a seller.
Other input variables of the trade-off algorithm were set
in the following way. The discriminatory power—the mag-
nitude of the difference between the input and output—of
the criteria function (equation 4) was set so that it exhib-
ited two properties. Firstly, that it has more discrimination
within the issues’ reservation values (as compared to values
outside this range), since most of the negotiation will take
place in this region. Thus, maximal discrimination should
be between an issue’s
m
i
n and
m
a
x values (section 2.1).
We parameterised this reservation value requirement by the
independent variable
 . When
  is low, the function should
be maximally discriminative for values within the issue’s
1Generally speaking, the differences in these weights are one of the key
elements that provide the opportunity for joint improvements (the other be-
ing the different shapes of the scoring functions). For example, an increase
in
p
r
i
c
e may have little effect in value for the
p
l
a
y
e
r, but relatively more
for the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t.reservation limits (mutatis mutandis when
  is high). Sec-
ondly, we also want to experiment with different discrimi-
natorypowerwithin the reservationrange(to supportdiffer-
ent similarity measures for different issues). For example,
for one issue it may be desirable to have maximal discrim-
ination at the centre of the reservation values, whereas for
another issue maximal discrimination may be desired at the
extremes of the reservation values. We parameterise this
requirement using the variable
 . When
  is high, more
discrimination is placed towards the maximum of the reser-
vation values (mutatis mutandis when it is low). The fol-
lowing function satisﬁes these two requirements:
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In this case, in order to be quite discriminatory,
  was
ﬁxed at
 
 
  for all issues. For all issues, we ﬁxed the
different
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 , to have linear criteria functions
 
h
￿
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s
  that
have equal discrimination power across the issue’s reserva-
tion values. We chose to make
  and
  constant to reduce
the number of free variables in the experiments. However,
normallythe settingofvaluesfor
  and
  reﬂects theagent’s
domain knowledge.
3.1.1 Single-Offer Experiment Variables
In these experiments the independent variables were: i) the
numberof children generated at each step in hillclimbing to
the iso-curve, ii) the number of steps taken to reach the iso-
curve and iii) the information that is available to an agent
regarding the importance (or weight) the opponent places
on each issue in computing the contract’s value (equation
3). Values for the ﬁrst and second variables control the
amountof search performedby the trade-offalgorithm. Ex-
periments were run where the number of children was se-
lected from the set
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
g. The number of steps to
the iso-curve was selected from the set
f
 
 
 
 
g. In the third
set of dependent variables, an agent can have perfect, par-
tial, imperfect or uncertain information on how the other
agent weights the issues that are input into its similarity
function (equation 3). In experiments with perfect infor-
mation, the algorithm, in computing similarity, is given the
other agent’s weights for different issues (cardinally correct
information). Partial information games are where the al-
gorithm is given the correct order of importance but not the
actual issue weights (ordinally correct information). Im-
perfect games represent the situation where the algorithm
is given no information about the other’s weights. Finally,
uncertain information games represent cases where the al-
gorithm is given undifferentiated weights for each issue, in
this case
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . The dependent variable in
allourexperimentsisthegeneratedcontractforbothagents.
The experimental procedure consisted of inputting two
contracts, representing
x and
y, into the algorithm under
each of the dependent variable environments and observ-
ing the execution trace of the algorithm for an offer from
the
p
l
a
y
e
r to the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t. All input contracts (
x and
y) were subject to the general constraint that
v
p
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  and
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x
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o
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y
 . This ensured
trade-offs are possible by ruling out all those contracts that
are already of a higher value to either party. The control
set was generated by chosing the preferred child randomly
at each step approaching the iso-curve (as opposed to using
the similarity criteria).
3.1.2 Meta Strategy Experiment Variables
The aim of these experiments was to empirically evalu-
ate the outcome and dynamics of negotiation when agents
used either a trade-off mechanism or a responsive mech-
anism or a combination of the two in the course of ne-
gotiation (that is, a meta strategy of which mechanism to
select in order to generate a series of counter-proposals).
The ﬁrst offer of both agents was generated using respon-
sive mechanisms, since the trade-off mechanism requires
at least one offer from the opponent. After that, an agent
is faced a choice of which mechanism to select. Since
there can be an inﬁnite number of meta strategies (as many
as potential sequences of chosings between responsive and
trade-off types of counterproposals), the meta strategies
considered in these experiments were limited to the set
f
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
v
e
 
s
m
a
r
t
 
s
e
r
i
a
l
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
g. Responsive sim-
ply selected the responsive mechanism for generating an
offer throughout negotiation. This was included to com-
pare the trade-off mechanism against an agent that always
concedes utility. A smart strategy consisted of deploying
a trade-off mechanism until the agent observed a deadlock
in the average closeness of offers between both agents as
measured by the similarity function. That is, the distance
between the offers was not reducing. Under these circum-
stances, the value of the previouslyofferedcontract,
V
a
 
x
 ,
was reducedby a predeterminedamount, here
 
 
 
 , thereby
lowering the input value of
  into the trade-off mechanism.
A serial strategy involves alternating between the trade-off
andresponsivemechanisms. Finally,the randommeta strat-
egy randomly selected between the two mechanisms. The
parameters of the responsive mechanism (see [4]) were set
to produce concession behaviours, since being responsive
often involves concessions in the light of environmental
needs (e.g. time, resources etc.). For the trade-off algo-
rithm, the number of children and number of steps were setto
 
 
  and
 
  respectively and the similarity weights were
set at uncertain settings of
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . Both ne-
gotiators were given a deadline of twenty offers.
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Figure 1 and the top row of ﬁgure 2 show the results
of varying, under different information inputs, the number
of children generated in single-offer experiments when the
number of steps to the iso-curve was set to
 
 . The bot-
tom row of ﬁgure 2 represents the case where the num-
ber of children was set to
 
 
 , but the trade-off algorithm
computed the iso-contract in a single step. The dot-dash
line represents the execution trace of the random control,
the solid line emanating from
y the similarity based trade-
off execution trace, and the line joining
 
 
 
 
  to
 
 
 
 
  the
pareto-optimal line. The results show four major patterns.
Firstly, when moving to the iso-curve if the space of possi-
ble contracts is not explored sufﬁciently,
  children (ﬁgure
1 top row) or
  step (ﬁgure 2 bottom row), then the gains of
the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t are small. More speciﬁcally, only when the
p
l
a
y
e
r has perfect information about the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t’s eval-
uations and the trade-off mechanism operates in 1 step with
100 children will the mechanism improve the offer (from
the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t’s perspective)(ﬁgure2 E). The next best con-
tract for the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t is when the
p
l
a
y
e
r has the same
value as
x (ﬁgure1 A). All other contracts generated by the
p
l
a
y
e
r when not fully exploring the search space (ﬁgures 1
B,C,D and 2 F) have lower value to the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t than
x.
Secondly, in nearly all cases, the similarity based trade-
off out performs the policy of randomly selecting a child
for the next step towards the iso-curve. However this pat-
tern does not hold for the cases of reaching the iso-curve
in one step under partial and uncertain informationenviron-
ments (ﬁgure1 G and H). This is the result of chance, rather
than randomness being a better strategy in this type of envi-
ronment.
Thirdly, the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t’s beneﬁt increases as the algo-
rithm performs more search (
  to
 
 
  children). Further-
more, there is no signiﬁcant difference between perfect and
partial information outcomes within the
 
 
  and
 
 
  result
categories. This indicates that our algorithm requires only
partial ordering information, rather than perfectly cardinal
orderings, in order to compute outcomes that are better for
the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t.
Finally, for all environments and variable combinations,
imperfect information results in signiﬁcantly poorer out-
comes for the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t than the other information classes.
This is only to be expected since search is directed towards
erroneous directions.
Figure 3 presents the data for the meta-strategy ex-
periments. Individual offers between the
p
l
a
y
e
r and the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t are depicted as circles and squares respectively.
The sequences of offers are joined by a solid line for the
p
l
a
y
e
r and a dotted line for the
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t. The ﬁnal agree-
ment is depicted as the offer where the circle and square
meet.
The observed data exhibits two patterns. Firstly, there
is a clear rank ordering across meta-strategy pairings over
the summed joint value gained for the ﬁnal outcome. The
highest joint gain is achieved in negotiations between two
s
m
a
r
t meta-strategists. In this case the ﬁnal outcome
is close to the pareto-optimal line, implying that such
a pairing of meta-strategies results in outcomes that are
most beneﬁcial to both parties. The remaining rankings
for
p
l
a
y
e
r
 
o
p
p
o
n
e
n
t pairings of meta-strategies are then
[smart,serial], [serial,serial], [smart,random], [smart,responsive],
[serial,responsive], [random,responsive], [random,random] with
respectivejoint gainsof 1.27,1.18,1.146,1.11,1.076,1.06,
0.99. Ingeneral,thehigherjoint utilities occurwhenatleast
one of the agents is
s
m
a
r
t. The
r
a
n
d
o
m meta strategists,
as expected, perform worst.
The other observable pattern relates to the number of
messages exchanged between agents using different meta-
strategies. This indirectly measures the communication
load a meta-strategy places on the agents. The observed
pattern is almost the reverse for the joint value outcomes
above, with a [smart,smart] pairing incurring the highest
communication cost (reaching a deal after 20 rounds), fol-
lowed by [random,random], [smart,responsive], [smart,random],
[smart,serial] (14 rounds), [serial,serial] (13 rounds), and [se-
rial,responsive], [smart,smart] (12 rounds). This observation
supports our intuition that higher joint utilities are gained
through greater search, which, in turn, involves more com-
munication between the agents.
In summary, these results indicate that unless agents
know, at least partially, the importance the other agent at-
taches to an issue, then the best policy for computing trade-
offs is to assign uncertain weightings to all issues. These
weightings can then be updated by some learning rule to-
wards partial or perfect information models, since a) in-
formation models are private and b) erroneous predictions
can result in poorer outcomes. Furthermore, engaging in
trade-off negotiation, particularly with a high search fac-
tor by both parties, results in higher joint gains. However,
this improvementis achieved at the expense of an increased
communication load.
4. Related Work
A number of approaches have been advocated for the
process of making decisions during the course of negotia-
tion. Chief amongst these is work on game theory. This
strandofworkhasproduceda largenumberofsophisticated
and specialised models [11], which, although analytically
well formed, are generally inappropriate for our purposes0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Figure 1. Data for
  children in
 
  steps (ﬁrst row) and
 
 
  children in
 
  steps (second row). A) &
E) Perfect information, B) & F) Imperfect information, C) & G) Partial Information, D) & H) Uncertain
information.
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  steps (ﬁrst row), and
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  step (second row). A) &
E) Perfect information B) & F) Imperfect information, C) & G) Partial Information, D) & H) Uncertain
information.
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Figure 3. Dynamics of Negotiation Process for Meta Strategies: A) smart v. smart, B) smart v.serial,
C) smart v. random D) smart v. responsive, E) serial v. serial, F) serial v. responsive, G) random v.
random, H) random v. responsive.(because they specify the solution properties and leave the
process of how to reach these points unspeciﬁed and be-
cause they generally violate our privacy of information re-
quirements). Strategic game theoretic models [12, 7], on
the other hand, do model the process of negotiation. How-
ever they often make unrealistic information assumptions
(eg that agents know each other’s type [5]) and they do not
model negotiation for joint gains. Overall, in contrast to
game theoretic models, our work is targeted more to open
systems, where information is sparse and computational re-
sources are limited. In such environments, a satisﬁcing so-
lution is the best that can be hoped for.
Uncertainty in negotiation was also addressed by us-
ing decision theoretic models in the Persuader system [15]
where multi-attribute utility theory was combined with
case-based reasoning in contexts where the agent had no
previous cases to reason with. This dual approachis similar
to our work in that agents use both utility and similarity for
decision making. However, we use similarity rather than
utility to address the inherent uncertainties involved and, as
we have shown in section 3.2, this appears to be a better
choice in uncertain environments.
The process of negotiation has also been modeled as a
distributed constraint satisfaction problem [13]. In such
cases, an agent’s objectives are represented as constraints
togetherwith their associated utilities. Strategies (e.g. com-
position, reconﬁguration and relaxation operators) are then
usedto modifythese constraints,orthe currentsolution, un-
til a ﬁnal solution is reached. The relaxation of constraints
is similar to our previous work on concession mechanism
for negotiation, and the modiﬁcation of the current solution
closely resembles the trade-off mechanism reported here.
However, in our work there is only one objective, namely
reaching a contract which maximises value. Therefore, our
approach is to develop reasoning mechanisms that deliber-
ate over raw values rather than objectives.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presented a formal model and a related algo-
rithm for carrying out trade-offs in automated negotiations.
The algorithm is designed to work in a distributed setting
in which agents have limited information about the prefer-
ences of their negotiation opponent and limited computa-
tional resources to devote to the negotiation process. An-
alytical and empirical evaluation showed our algorithm to
be effective in such cases. Moreover, even when compara-
tively little informationis knownabout the opponent’spref-
erences, our algorithm still ﬁnds reasonable trade-offs and
does so in an acceptable number of negotiation cycles.
For the future, we aim to use similarity measures to ma-
nipulate the set of negotiation issues at run-time, as well as
using fuzzy techniques to model an agent’s preferences and
its ratings of the importance of the negotiation issues.
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